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The leaders realize, not without a certain astonishment, the wealth of 
spirit, the capacity for reasoning and clear statement of ideas, the facility 
for comprehension and assimilation of concepts on the part of popula-
tions who only yesterday were forgotten if not despised and regarded by 
the colonizer, and even by some natives, as incompetent beings.
amilcar cabral
∵
In this chapter I focus on listening as a potentially revolutionary pedagogical 
activity. I argue that listening should not be understood as an essentially pas-
sive state, and focus on pedagogical situations where the educator can be mis-
led by prejudices regarding the abilities, or lack thereof, of the individuals that 
the pedagogue is interacting with in a specific pedagogical context. I will be 
mostly concerned with pedagogy in the context of political and social move-
ments. In the first section, I argue that there is a direct relationship between 
the manner in which dominant social groups, especially ruling classes in soci-
eties stratified along class lines, accumulate social power in a given society and 
the manner in which the conceptual tools that are available for the interpreta-
tion of social reality make it difficult for members of oppressed social groups to 
interpret social reality in a way that accords with their interests, either because 
the adequate conceptual tools are not part of the conceptual repertoire of 
their society, or because they do not have access to them due to their mate-
rial conditions (grinding poverty, illiteracy, etc.). I argue that the revolutionary 
pedagogue must be aware of this structural problem.
In the second section, I draw on the methods of participatory action research 
in an attempt to specify what the revolutionary pedagogue must be like as a lis-
tener in order to compensate for the existence of this deficiency in adequate 
conceptual tools for the analysis of social reality and the identification of objec-
tive social interests on the part of members of oppressed social groups. In other 
words, I specify the qualities that revolutionary pedagogues must possess as 
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listeners in order to fulfill their task. In the third and concluding section, I argue 
that in order to compensate for the structural problem that I identify in the 
first section, pedagogues must be willing to identify with the members of the 
oppressed groups that they are attempting to teach (in a dialogical manner). 
They must be willing to commit what Amilcar Cabral called class suicide and its 
analogues in relation to other forms of oppression (Cabral, 1979a, p. 126).
 Social Dominance and Its Reflection in Conceptual Resources
Differentials in social power in a given socially stratified society (stratified 
along lines of class, gender, and race) are reflected in the set of conceptual 
tools through which people structure, identify, and analyze their social experi-
ences.1 This point was made by Marx and Engels in The German Ideology:
The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., the 
class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its 
ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material pro-
duction at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of 
mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those 
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling 
ideas are nothing more than the ideal expressions of the dominant mate-
rial relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; 
hence of the relationships which make one class the ruling one, there-
fore, the ideas of its dominance. (Marx & Engels, 2013, p. 64)
This means that ruling classes in society produce the conceptual scheme 
through which people interpret their social reality.2 This becomes clearer if 
we look at a historical example. In Ancient Egyptian peasants, who made up 
the vast majority of the population, had no say in the formulation of the con-
ceptual schemes through which social reality was interpreted. Consequently, 
despite the fact that the ancient Egyptian state apparatus was essentially 
a machine for the exploitation of peasant labor, as the economic historian 
 Robert C. Allen puts it: “the main function of the Pharaonic state was to trans-
fer a considerable fraction of the income produced by Egypt’s farmers to an 
unproductive aristocracy,” no conception of exploitation was ever formulated 
in ancient Egyptian discourse (Allen, 1997, p. 139).3 For it is clear that it was 
not in the interests of the Pharaoh, his family, the state bureaucrats, the priest-
hood, and private landowners to formulate a concept like the concept of the 
exploitation of labor, since their very existence (qua parasitic, unproductive 
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aristocracy) depended on the preservation of that relation of exploitation. 
Consequently, an Egyptian peasant simply could not formulate a belief such as 
“I am being exploited because…” or “the landowners are exploiting my labor by 
doing….” This had nothing to do with any lack of conscientiousness qua epis-
temic agents on their part, but was simply a structural fact about the collective 
conceptual resources which were available to them. Here we have a case where 
social power was almost completely in the hands of dominant social groups 
(in this case grouped by class, and specifically by their relation to the surplus 
that is produced by the peasantry), and this near complete monopoly of social 
power was reflected in a near complete monopoly on the manner in which 
the conceptual resources of this society were structured. I say near complete 
monopoly because we do have some evidence of resistance to exploitation, 
articulated in the surviving literature from Ancient Egypt. Specifically, The 
Tale of the Eloquent Peasant, composed during the Twelfth Dynasty (1985–1773 
BC). However, even this expression of resistance is hampered by the fact that it 
employs a conceptual scheme that makes it difficult for peasants to see them-
selves as agents who can bring about justice through their own activity. Ulti-
mately, in this tale the peasant is only petitioning the Pharaoh to rectify an 
unjust situation (Parkinson, 2000, p. 42).
The transparency of relations of exploitation in the ancient Egypt (along 
with other societies where the tributary mode of production was dominant), 
has led some Marxist theorists to maintain that the only way to explain how 
such societies could survive (in that form) is if ideology was dominant (as in 
not just existent and influential, but essentially without significant challengers 
when it comes to interpreting social experience). As Samir Amin puts it: “The 
transparency of the relationships of exploitation in these societies demands 
that the ideological play a predominant role and be regarded as sacred” (Amin, 
2009, p. 111). If this is true, then the question arises how was ideology so domi-
nant that it could not be challenged in anyway? Perhaps the disparity between 
exploiters and exploited in the ability to shape collective hermeneutical 
resources was so great that any attempt to counter the dominance of ideology 
would not have been able to get off the ground so to speak. Here we have a 
clear case where the individuals who compose the ruling class “rule also as 
thinkers, as producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution 
of the ideas of their age: thus, their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch” 
(Marx & Engels, 2013, pp. 64–65). This thesis holds across all societies where 
there is social domination by one group over other groups. For instance, in 
the colonial situation the conceptual scheme through which social reality was 
interpreted was one that was imposed by the colonizing social group. As Albert 
Memmi has pointed out, in Tunisia, for example, the colonized were made to 
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believe that their destitution has its cause in their own laziness (Memmi, 1974, 
pp. 124–125). Aimé Césaire has pointed out the same phenomenon in other 
French colonies: “I am talking about millions of men in whom fear has been 
cunningly instilled, who have been taught to have an inferiority complex, to 
tremble, kneel, despair, and behave like flunkeys” (Césaire, 1972, p. 7).
It is reasonable to suggest that the power of the dominant social group to 
shape the conceptual schemes through which social reality is interpreted var-
ies from one mode of production to another. In the tributary mode of produc-
tion, where relations of exploitation are transparent, the only way in which 
we can explain the relative stability of such social formations is if we posit 
that the power of the dominant social group to shape the conceptual schemes 
through which social reality is interpreted is greater than in social formations 
where relations of exploitation are not transparent (e.g., in social formations 
where the capitalist mode of production is dominant). However, it is necessary 
to account for events such as peasant rebellions and slave revolts, so it is nec-
essary to engage in historical studies of specific social formations in order to 
test this hypothesis.
It is worth noting however, that the existence of slave revolts in Ancient 
Rome for instance does not by itself disprove this hypothesis, for it is one thing 
to maintain that the dominant social group produce the conceptual scheme 
through which social reality is interpreted, and it is another thing to maintain 
that this conceptual scheme can never justify revolt by the oppressed. What I 
am claiming is that this conceptual scheme is skewed towards the preservation 
of the interests of the dominant social group and not that it can never serve the 
interests of the oppressed social groups. There is a difference between a tool 
which is not optimally suited to the actualization of one’s objective interests 
and one which can never be used towards the actualization of one’s objective 
interests under any circumstances. I think that the ruling ideology, from the 
point of view of the oppressed, is similar to the former rather than the latter. 
Moreover, we must account for why, for instance, slave revolts almost never 
occurred in ancient Greece (Cartledge, 2003).4 Ideological limitations and 
constraints are surely part of the explanation. Though the power of the dom-
inant social group to shape the conceptual schemes through which people 
understand their social reality may vary from one social formation to another, 
it is not clear how any kind of domination can be sustained for long periods 
of time without domination on the ideological level. Hence, my thesis would 
hold for all Western societies that comprise the imperialist core, as well as the 
dominated societies of the periphery that are ruled by a class of comprador 
bourgeoisie in today’s world. In so far as both sets of societies are instantia-
tions of socially stratified societies.
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The revolutionary pedagogue must take this into consideration when 
listening to the testimony of members of social classes and groups that are 
oppressed. It is helpful to draw on some contemporary work in feminist episte-
mology to specify the characteristics that the revolutionary pedagogue should 
possess. Miranda Fricker defines the virtue of the hermeneutically just listener 
(or interlocutor) in the following terms: “an alertness or sensitivity to the possi-
bility that the difficulty one’s interlocutor is having as she tries to render some-
thing communicatively intelligible is due not to its being a nonsense or her 
being a fool, but rather to some sort of gap in collective hermeneutic resources 
[of a given society]” (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). This point is important insofar as it 
is necessary for the pedagogue as a listener to think of the manner in which the 
hegemony of the ideas of the ruling class in a given society might impede the 
oppressed from articulating their interests and problems in a clear discursive 
manner. However, unlike Fricker, I would emphasize the lack of availability of 
the requisite conceptual resources as opposed to the existence of some “gap” in 
collective conceptual resources. For example, the fieldwork conducted by radi-
cal feminist researchers, such as Marjorie Mbilinyi, amongst poor rural women 
in the Global South shows that the issue is often not so much that the concepts 
which are necessary for the oppressed to make sense of their social experi-
ences in ways that would enable to them to assert their interests and defend 
them do not exist in their societies, but rather the issue is that due to their 
social position (being illiterate, lacking formal education, and being relatively 
isolated from centers of intellectual discourse, etc.) they do not have access to 
them (Mbilinyi, 1993, 1998, 2015; MOTT, 1979).5
The characterization of the epistemic situation of poor rural women and of 
members of oppressed social groups is a complicated task. On the one hand, 
we see that research teams like the MOTT (the Mobile Orientation and Train-
ing Team of the Indian Social Institute) emphasize the fact that these women 
suffer from “a state of submerged consciousness,” and I think that what they 
mean here is that they do not have an explicit structural social analysis of their 
situation, and not that they do not know anything about their interests and 
how they are systematically thwarted. On the other hand, Mbilinyi emphasizes 
that in almost three decades of participatory action research she has been 
constantly reminded that “exploited and oppressed women know—they are 
not ignorant.” (Mbilinyi, 2015, p. 517).6 This is not incompatible with the claim 
that oppressed women may find it difficult to articulate knowledge claims 
in certain kinds of discursive forms (i.e., in the form of sentences expressing 
propositions). Reflection on the results obtained by this research indicates that 
we should not think that an inability to express one’s interpretation of espe-
cially crucial aspects of one’s experience in propositional form is a sufficient 
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condition for inferring that the person who is unable to do so is unable to inter-
pret their experience at all. However, it must be admitted that the inability 
to articulate one’s experiences in discursive form makes it difficult to develop 
a theoretically rigorous interpretation of social reality. The revolutionary peda-
gogue must confront the question that was posed to members of MOTT: “How 
can leaders be trained among illiterates?” (MOTT, 1979, p. 15).
  The Relevance of Participatory Action Research for the 
Revolutionary Pedagogue
Given that the aim of participatory action research (PAR) as it has been for-
mulated by Mbilinyi is to strengthen “the capacity of oppressed and exploited 
women and men to organize themselves, analyze their own situations, identify 
basic causes of their problems, and carry out strategic actions for change,” it is 
clear that the techniques developed by those engaged in PAR are relevant to 
the revolutionary pedagogue (Mbilinyi, 2015, p. 516).7 The connection between 
PAR and revolutionary pedagogy is both historical and conceptual. It is his-
torical because PAR’s ancestry can be traced to Paulo Freire’s Pedagogy of the 
Oppressed (first published in 1968, then translated into English in 1970), and 
the debates that took place at Dar es Salaam University in the late 1960s and 
early 1970s about how to recast and adapt historical materialism to the situa-
tion in Tanzania (Park & Kinsey, 1991).8 PAR has been used to help rural women 
in countries like Tanzania, and India develop their own political and social 
movements. Both radical pedagogues and the adherents of PAR subscribe 
to the claim that “Education ought to enable whomever acquires it to fight 
against oppression” (Mbilinyi, 2010, p. 89) and that “the job of teachers is revo-
lution” (Mbilinyi, 2010, p. 90).
PAR’s methodology is essentially aimed at the transformation of both the 
pedagogues (or the facilitators, in the language of PAR) and the participants 
(those who would usually be called “the subjects of the study” in standard 
social sciences research jargon). PAR is based on the assumption that one 
cannot be a responsible interlocutor without being able to recognize the con-
straints that are placed on the oppressed groups’ ability to communicate and 
articulate their experiences in propositional form. To this end, facilitators are 
trained to identify the way in which differentials in social power can structure 
the conversations that they have with members of oppressed groups (Mbilinyi, 
2015, p. 517). The importance of dialogue for conducting participatory action 
research cannot be overstated. It is precisely the type of dialogue which aims at 
creating a more inclusive hermeneutic climate. It fits rather well with Fricker’s 
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own description of that kind of dialogue: “such dialogue involves a more 
pro-active and more socially aware kind of listening than is usually required 
in more straightforward communicative exchanges. This sort of listening 
involves listening as much to what is not said as to what is said” (Fricker, 2007, 
pp. 171–172). In this kind of dialogue, it is crucial that the facilitator or peda-
gogue avoids giving the impression that she is lecturing her interlocutor, since 
this simply reinforces the epistemic identity which has been thrust upon those 
individuals, i.e., passive subjects who cannot know or think for themselves.
This kind of dialogue requires that the pedagogue be willing to engage with 
her interlocutor in a manner which conveys her respect and recognition of 
the fact that her interlocutor is a capable epistemic agent, who is able to offer 
reasonable explanations for their behavior and experiences, if they are pro-
vided with a suitable dialogical environment. This point is important because 
one might think that recognition of the existence of a structural imbalance 
in the conceptual resources that are available for the interpretation of social 
reality which adversely affects one’s interlocutors should lead one to adopt 
an undemanding stance towards them. However, one should recognize that 
their confidence in their own epistemic abilities is often completely shattered, 
especially in the case of those who have been subjected to abuse. Due to the 
manner in which their status as epistemic agents has been consistently under-
mined by structures that perpetuate their oppression, it is important to recog-
nize that members of socially oppressed group may not even trust their own 
experiences (Maguire, 1987, p. 157). Hence, it is incumbent upon the revolu-
tionary pedagogue to listen to them in a manner that clearly conveys that she 
takes them seriously as interpreters of their own experiences.
Moreover, one should recognize that even though such individuals may 
often attempt to explain their situation in a way that seems excessively sub-
jectivist, it is often the case that there are social theories which are implicit in 
their narratives. The role of the revolutionary pedagogue in a political or social 
movement is to attempt to get her interlocutors to articulate explicitly the the-
ories that are implicit in their first-person accounts.9 Moreover, when listening 
one should not focus obsessively on tracking occurrences of the words that 
one expects to hear, (e.g., exploitation, alienation, etc.). The pedagogue should 
convey to her interlocutors that one is a listener who is going to account for the 
fact that their ability to interpret their experience and to communicate their 
interpretations in propositional form is hampered by the structural issues that 
I have identified in the first section.
It is crucial to keep in mind the social situation of one’s interlocutors (and 
how that affects the conceptual resources that are available to them) when 
attempting to interpret what they say. Often, the responses to questions will 
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seem, to the untrained ear, almost unintelligible qua answers to the specific 
questions that have been posed. They will seem almost completely irrelevant 
as answers. However, the pedagogue should recognize that the apparent unin-
telligibility often reflects a deficiency on her part and not on the part of her 
interlocutors. It is the role of the revolutionary pedagogue to interpret what 
her interlocutors want to say despite the fact that they lack the conceptual 
apparatus to convey it in propositional form.
For instance, rural women, from Kadimpara in Bangladesh, gave the follow-
ing response when asked about their energy needs as part of a project con-
ducted from 1985 to 1987: “We put in a lot of sweat to grow the turmeric. At the 
time of harvest, we are so desperate for cash to buy our foodstuff that when 
a rich man offers us 300–400 takas per maund, we sell it right away. He then 
dries it in the sun and sells dry ginger for more than 2,000 takas per maund” 
( Bajracharya, Morse, & Pongsapich, 1989, p. 25). The first impression that one 
may get from this answer is that it is completely inadequate and irrelevant as 
an answer to the question “what are your energy needs?” After all, what does 
the price of turmeric have to do with the village’s energy needs? However, the 
facilitators who have been trained to recognize that their interlocutors might 
not have the concepts that they need to convey their meaning clearly in prop-
ositional form were able to understand that the village women were actually 
expressing a demand for ways to dry the turmeric that they grow so that they 
can keep the added value, and not have it accrue to middlemen. In other words, 
given the situation of the villagers, their answer made perfect sense once one 
recognized the conceptual constraints that they were operating under.
It is important to recognize that while the apparent confusion is often not 
attributable to the speaker but rather to the listener, it is equally important to 
recognize that the search for clarity should not be abandoned. Audrey Thomp-
son, on the other hand, advocates for the adoption of “broken listening” which 
“is not meant to dispel contradiction, eliminate confusion, and impose clarity” 
(Thompson, 2010, p. 7). I do not see how progress can be made in terms of the 
development of a more refined understanding of social reality on the part of 
the oppressed without an emphasis on clarity as a goal for the oppressed in 
relation to their interpretations of their own social reality. Thompson focuses 
excessively on the pedagogue in the context of her discussion of clarity, in 
the sense that she focuses on whether the content of the dialogue should be 
transparent to the pedagogue. On the other hand, I am more interested in the 
necessary conditions which must obtain for the oppressed to attain clarity 
regarding their own interpretations of reality. Moreover, there is no evidence 
to suggest that the oppressed somehow wish to preserve unclarity in rela-
tion to their own interpretations of social reality. This excessive focus on the 
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pedagogue or on what dialogue is thought to accomplish for the pedagogue is 
also reflected in some of Alison Jones’ work. Jones argues that “while marginal-
ized groups may be invited—with the help of the teacher—to make their own 
conditions visible to themselves, the crucial aspect of this process is making 
themselves visible to the powerful” (Jones, 1999, p. 308). There are two things 
to note here. First, the oppressed must indeed make themselves visible to the 
powerful not as a gesture of surrender at the epistemic level, but rather as a 
material political gesture. The powerful should see the oppressed and should 
understand that the oppressed have understood the conditions which make 
the perpetuation of their oppression possible and that they have in hand a 
theory of social transformation which makes it possible for them to under end 
their oppression. The powerful should be confronted by the presence of the 
oppressed as a historical subject which they should fear. Jones claims that in 
dialogue “the address of the other involves answering the colonizer’s benign, 
maybe even apologetic, request: ‘tell us exactly what happened’” (Jones, 1999, 
p. 309). However, in the case of the colonial context for example, the oppressed 
were encouraged by anti-colonial movements to make themselves visible to 
the colonizer not in order to tell them what happened and how they felt about 
it qua passive objects. Rather they made themselves visible to the colonizers 
in order to tell them what they would do, specifically, what they would do to 
them. Second, there is a significant difference between the context that I am 
interested in, namely the process of the construction of political and social 
movements that are led by the oppressed themselves, and the context within 
which Jones is presenting her critique of dialogue, namely the classroom. In 
the context of the process of the construction of political and social move-
ments, the oppressed are almost exclusively focused on understanding their 
own conditions, and not on revealing themselves to the pedagogue. In fact, the 
aim of dialogue in the context that I am interested in is to create social move-
ments that do not need the guidance or even the presence of the pedagogue. 
The classroom as a site that binds the interlocutors to the pedagogue is absent 
in the context that I am interested in.
Facilitators must also be aware that communication in discursive form (in 
the form of sentences expressing propositions) is not the only way through 
which people can convey what they mean. Facilitators must be attuned to the 
possibility that their interlocutors might be more comfortable communicating 
their interpretations of their experiences in other ways, and that they might 
be more receptive to the information that the facilitator wants to convey if it 
is conveyed using other means of communication. Moreover, one should rec-
ognize that in relation to certain domains of knowledge, non-verbal forms of 
expression may be superior to verbal forms of expression. This was something 
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that the researchers of MOTT discovered during their work with rural women 
in the state of Orissa (now known as Odisha) in eastern India. The research 
team was attempting to train a group of 40 women (32 of whom could not read 
or write at all) to become health workers in their communities. The team was 
essentially not making any progress through discursive exposition of lessons 
about basic health practices and how to identify the various diseases which 
are prevalent in the region. They noticed that the women would break out 
into chants, dances during lessons. At first, they interpreted this as a sign that 
the women were simply not interested in learning. However, through careful 
thought about the hermeneutic tools which these women had access to, they 
came to realize that chants and dances were key tools through which those 
women interpreted their experiences and conveyed them to others. In other 
words, the facilitators were able to discover that the women far from being 
uninterested in learning were subtly trying to educate their would-be educa-
tors on how best to educate them. Consequently, the facilitators changed their 
approach, and crafted the entire syllabus in the form of dances and chants 
(MOTT, 1979, p. 66). The radical pedagogue must not forget that “it is essen-
tial to educate the educator himself,” and that the educator must at all times 
be prepared to be educated by the recipients of education regarding both the 
content of the education and the form in which it is presented (Marx, 1978, 
p. 144). However, recognizing that non-verbal forms of communication may 
be superior to verbal forms of communication in relation to some domains of 
knowledge does not imply that one should hold the view that the expression of 
knowledge in propositional form is not important as a goal in relation to other 
domains of knowledge, e.g., theories of history.
We should not think that the acquisition of adequate theoretical models for 
understanding social reality is superfluous, simply because people are not help-
less without them. The issue is whether the acquisition of such theoretical mod-
els is helpful for the oppressed in their struggle to overturn the given social order, 
given that one of the ways in which the social order perpetuates itself is through 
the imposition of a conceptual scheme for the interpretation of social reality 
that is skewed towards the interests of the dominant social groups. This is not 
to say that there is no room for maneuver within the context of that conceptual 
scheme for members of oppressed social groups. However, this does not mean 
that this conceptual scheme is optimal for the analysis of society from the stand-
point of the interests of the oppressed, and the aim of radical pedagogy should 
be to overcome the constraints that are imposed by this conceptual scheme.
Recognizing that the fault may often be with the pedagogue, and not with 
her interlocutors, the radical pedagogue must always check with her inter-
locutor in order to ascertain if she has understood her correctly, and, more 
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importantly, must realize that her interlocutor may not verbalize her belief that 
she has been misunderstood. Revisiting testimonial exchanges in this manner 
allows the interlocutor to add things that they wanted to say but that they were 
reluctant to say the first time around because they might have thought that the 
person listening would treat what they said as an expression of folly, if they 
did not have the concepts needed to express what they meant clearly in prop-
ositional form. There is also another factor which should motivate revisiting 
testimonial exchanges, namely the fact that the interlocutor might have more 
to add because her confidence in her epistemic abilities has increased because 
of her interaction with a sensitive listener.10
 Committing Class Suicide and Listening in a Revolutionary Way
If the pedagogue comes from a social group that is relatively powerful in rela-
tion to her interlocutors, the attempt must be made to adjust for this fact by 
identifying with one’s interlocutors. Identification in this context requires that 
the pedagogues live among the people and that they actively participate in 
their struggles. For instance, if the pedagogue is working with women who 
are struggling to have a maternity clinic built in their village, the pedagogue 
should be actively involved in their struggle. She should take part in their pro-
test marches, participate in their conformations with government officials 
and so on. In other words, identification here is understood as a form of ongo-
ing concrete social activity (this might help differentiate identification from 
merely feeling sympathy towards their struggles). The thesis is that without 
such identification, the pedagogue will not be able to understand the specific 
ways in which the oppressed have difficulties in articulating their interests in 
relation to specific demands in the form of sentences expressing propositions. 
Failure to recognize this and to attempt to correct for it can lead to the failure 
of entire projects. For example, the members of MOTT emphasize that “Indi-
viduals can spend years in the rural area without really coming close to the 
rural poor, except physically” (MOTT, 1979, p. 16). In other words, without a 
deep commitment to and identification with the interests of the rural poor 
(taking the interests of the poor to be one’s own), especially the women among 
them, one will not be able to understand their concerns and the way in which 
their ability to express their concerns in propositional form is often thwarted 
because of the lack of adequate hermeneutical resources. To do this the peda-
gogues must commit class suicide. The term ‘class suicide’ as coined by Amil-
car Cabral refers to the need of members of the petty bourgeoisie to forgo their 
allegiance to the interests of their class and to identify with the interests of the 
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oppressed. In other words, the radical pedagogue must destroy her sense of self 
qua member of the petty bourgeoisie or a member of the bourgeoisie, and “be 
restored to life in the condition of a revolutionary worker completely identi-
fied with the deepest aspirations of the people to which he [or she] belongs” 
(Cabral, 1979a, p. 136).
This means that tremendous demands are made of the pedagogue. In fact, 
the MOTT researchers go so far as to say that an effective facilitator among the 
rural poor must reconstruct their own sense of identity, i.e., the effective facili-
tators must become class traitors, and if they are men, gender traitors: “we must 
die to our class-belonging [become class traitors] and resurrect with the victims 
of a class-society” (MOTT, 1979, p. 29). It is worth remarking that even though 
the language of treason might be criticized for being rather too dramatic, it is 
in some respects more accurate than the language of allyship (which seems to 
dominate “progressive” discourse in North America). The language of treason 
makes it clear that a man who, for example, attempts to take a stand against 
a patriarchal social system is betraying his own material interests as well as 
the normative ideals that have shaped his very sense of selfhood. He is rebel-
ling against the destiny which was assigned to him to by society (i.e., to be an 
oppressor of women). It is not clear that the label of “ally” adequately describes 
the massive rupture which is necessary for someone attempting to identify 
with the interests of the oppressed (which would involve undermining one’s 
own material interests qua member of a privileged group), and therefore some-
one attempting to essentially destroy their social identity and replace it with a 
new one. Moreover, because class suicide requires that one should turn against 
the normative ideals which have previously shaped one’s self-understanding, it 
is inevitable that class suicide will not be an instantaneous resurrection with 
a new identity. It will inevitably be a process with many temporary setbacks. 
This means that class suicide is a process which requires constant self-criti-
cism as well criticism by others. The context for such criticism is provided by 
the dialogical context. It is through interactions with one’s interlocutors that 
elements, e.g., bourgeois prejudices that one carries, about oneself that are not 
visible to oneself can be made known to oneself through others, who due to 
their social position are better attuned towards the detection of elements, and 
who consequently can teach the pedagogue how to progress further towards 
the successful actualization of the process that is class suicide. Nonetheless, 
this is only a byproduct of the pedagogical process, it is not its main aim.
Though it may be demanding, identification with the interests and social 
position (and the hermeneutical and epistemic limitations that are associated 
with it) of the oppressed is what makes revolutionary pedagogy possible: “we 
need, therefore, to enter with empathy into the ‘limit-situation’ in which these 
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people are caught. If we succeed we will find the explanations they give, of 
their way of life and of their economic practices, often very admirable” (MOTT, 
1979, p. 23). Hence, to learn to listen in a revolutionary manner, one must par-
ticipate in the revolutionary struggle. No sheer mental act of willing can serve 
as a substitute for concrete struggle. Class suicide and its attendant ideologi-
cal transformation can only take place in the course of a process of concrete 
struggle: “Such reconversion—re-Africanization in our case—may take place 
before the struggle but is completed only during the course of the struggle, 
through daily contact with the mass of the people and the communion of sac-
rifices which the struggle demands” (Cabral, 1979b, p. 145). What we have here 
in outline is the description of the pedagogical process as essentially a “struggle 
against our own weaknesses” (Cabral, 1979a, p. 121). It is a struggle against the 
weaknesses of the pedagogues in relation to their underdeveloped receptiv-
ity to knowledge and interpretations of reality expressed in non-propositional 
form. It is also a struggle against the weaknesses of the oppressed in relation to 
their ability to interpret social reality in propositional form in a manner that 
accords best with their objective interests.
 Notes
1 The feminist epistemologist Miranda Fricker makes a similar point with her con-
cept of hermeneutic injustice. According to Fricker hermeneutic injustice is “the 
injustice of having some significant area of one’s social experience obscured from 
collective understanding owing to a structural identity prejudice in the collective 
hermeneutical resource” (Fricker, 2007, p. 155). However, Fricker, in so far as she 
approaches the issue from what remains an essentially liberal standpoint, is pri-
marily concerned with how the individual listener can attempt to compensate for 
the existence of hermeneutic injustice through being a virtuous listener. She is not 
primarily interested in how one can develop a revolutionary pedagogical practice 
that contributes towards the revolutionary overthrow of the material conditions 
which give rise to hermeneutic injustice in the first place. However, combined with 
a materialist social theory, her work is clearly useful in articulating what the revo-
lutionary pedagogue must do as a listener. In this chapter, I will be using her term 
‘hermeneutical resources’ interchangeably with the term ‘conceptual resources.’
2 I think that this is a more precise and accurate formulation of what Paulo Freire 
is trying to capture with the idea that the oppressed internalize their oppressors 
(Freire, 1983, p. 166).
3 Though there was certainly a conception of justice or Ma’at (Jeffers, 2013). Nonethe-
less, the concept of economic exploitation has greater specificity than the concept 
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of injustice, so one should not infer from this fact that there was an adequate sub-
stitute for the concept of exploitation.
4 Although we should not think that resistance to slavery was ever absent. However, 
there is a significant difference between resistance to slavery and full-blown slave 
rebellions.
5 It is important to qualify the lack of education as a lack of “formal” education, rather 
than a lack of education as such, since in many cases those women have had to learn 
to abide by the limits of what they can and cannot do given the oppressive struc-
tures which govern their lives. Even if this does not amount to a clear interpretation 
of their social experiences, it is a form of education which helps them identify the 
contours of their social environments and potential grounds for resistance. As the 
members of the Mobile Orientation and Training Team (MOTT) of the Indian Social 
Institute (based in New Delhi) put it in their report outlining the lessons learned 
from conducting participatory action research among various communities in rural 
India from 1977 to 1979: “Though life has taught people struggling for mere survival 
many lessons, they nevertheless live in a state of submerged consciousness” (MOTT, 
1979, p. 24).
6 I should add that there is a strand in Mbilinyi’s writings that can be characterized 
as quite close to the feminist standpoint epistemology that has been articulated by 
Nancy Hartsock. Mbilinyi often seems to subscribe to Hartsock’s thesis that: “like 
the lives of proletarians according to Marxian theory, women’s lives make available 
a particular and privileged vantage point on male supremacy, a vantage point which 
can ground a powerful critique of the phallocratic institutions and ideology which 
constitute the capitalist form of patriarchy” (Hartsock, 1983, p. 284).
7 See also Bajracharya, Morse, and Pongsapich (1987, p. 4).
8 Mbilinyi also emphasizes the importance of the politically and socially charged 
environment in Tanzania in the 1970s in motivating the development of the meth-
ods of participatory action research: “Intellectuals in Tanzania were challenged to 
identify with the interests and struggles of oppressed laboring classes in Tanzania, 
and to promote a new kind of research which sought to break the division of mental 
and manual labor” (Mbilinyi, 1989, pp. 207–208).
9 Compare this to Mao’s approach to political education: “we must teach the masses 
clearly what we have received from them confusedly” (quoted from Freire, 1983, p. 82).
10 For a specific example of this scenario see Mbilinyi (1998).
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